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Efficiency, Equality, and Labeling: An Experimental 
Investigation of Focal Points in Explicit Bargaining†
By Andrea Isoni, Anders Poulsen, Robert Sugden, and Kei Tsutsui*
We investigate Schelling’s hypothesis that payoff-irrelevant labels (“cues”) can influence the outcomes of bargaining games with 
communication. In our experimental games, players negotiate over 
the division of a surplus by claiming valuable objects that have 
 payoff-irrelevant spatial locations. Negotiation occurs in continuous 
time, constrained by a deadline. In some games, spatial cues are 
opposed to principles of equality or efficiency. We find a strong ten-
dency for players to agree on efficient and minimally unequal payoff 
divisions, even if spatial cues suggest otherwise. But if there are two 
such divisions, cues are often used to select between them, inducing 
distributional effects. (JEL C78, D63, D83)
In The Strategy of Conflict, Thomas C. Schelling (1960, pp. 53, 67–74) proposes 
the hypothesis that the outcomes of bargaining problems can be systematically influ-
enced by “incidental details” or (as they would now be called) properties of framing 
or labeling. These labeling properties or cues have no direct relationship to pay-
offs and are not represented in standard game-theoretic models, but they neverthe-
less provide a means by which players can coordinate their expectations. Although 
much of his theoretical analysis and all of his informal experiments are concerned 
with simultaneous-move games without communication, Schelling claims that this 
hypothesis applies to “explicit bargaining with full communication and enforce-
ment.” He acknowledges that communication provides mechanisms for coordina-
tion that are not present in his simple experiments, but still argues that framing 
properties can remain significant in explicit bargaining. Most subsequent bargaining 
theory has not used this idea. But if real-world bargaining is substantially affected 
by payoff-irrelevant cues, a satisfactory theory of bargaining needs to take account 
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of that fact. Our paper reports experimental tests of Schelling’s hypothesis in a range 
of different bargaining games.
To date, there has been surprisingly little experimental investigation of the role 
of payoff-irrelevant cues in explicit bargaining games.1 It is now well established 
that equilibrium selection in pure coordination games is strongly influenced by how 
strategies are labeled, and that players of these games often achieve high degrees 
of coordination by making use of concepts of salience (e.g., Mehta, Starmer, and 
Sugden 1994; Bacharach and Bernasconi 1997; Bardsley et al. 2010). For games 
in which the players have a common interest in coordinating but have conflicting 
preferences between equilibria, the evidence is more mixed. Investigating match-
ing games (that is, games in which each player sees the same set of labels and 
chooses one of them, with the aim of making the same choice as her coplayer(s)), 
Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2008) find a strong tendency for coordina-
tion on salient labels if the players’ interests are fully aligned, but that these effects 
sometimes disappear when that alignment is less than perfect. In contrast, when 
mixed-motive games are framed as problems of tacit bargaining over the division of 
a stock of value, payoff-irrelevant cues have been found to have strong effects (Isoni 
et al. 2013). But it is still an open question whether conclusions about the role of 
 payoff-irrelevant cues in tacit bargaining extend to explicit bargaining.
In a tacit bargaining game, the players have only one chance to reach agreement. 
By contrast, when bargainers can communicate with one another and make offers 
and counteroffers, additional mechanisms for the coordination of expectations are 
available, and payoff-based principles such as efficiency and equality might have 
more influence. Joseph Farrell’s (1987) analysis of cheap talk shows that, for games 
with a Battle of the Sexes structure, preplay communication can facilitate agreement 
on one of the two pure-strategy equilibria; the symmetry between the two players 
is broken by their probabilistic choice of messages in the symmetric  mixed-strategy 
equilibrium, rather than by asymmetric cues.2 These considerations might seem to 
support the intuition that payoff-irrelevant cues lose their power when bargaining is 
explicit.
However, Schelling offers a backward-induction argument against that intuition. 
This argument applies to bargaining that takes place over a finite interval of time, 
ending at a fixed deadline or “midnight bell.” Because of the deadline, a “perfectly 
move-symmetrical bargaining game” must have a final round of simultaneous play. 
Thus, a game with communication “necessarily gives way, at some definite penulti-
mate moment, to a tacit (noncooperative) bargaining game.” Schelling then argues: 
“Each player must be assumed to know this and may, if he wishes, by simply avoid-
ing overt agreement, elect to play the tacit game instead” (1960, pp. 267–272, ital-
ics in original). If it is common knowledge that the tacit game, if reached, will be 
resolved in a particular way, then neither player will agree to an inferior payoff in 
1 Following Schelling, we distinguish between “explicit” and “tacit” bargaining. In explicit bargaining problems, 
the players have access to a rich message space, can communicate with one another in real time, and are able to 
reach binding agreements. In tacit bargaining problems, the players choose their strategies simultaneously without 
prior communication. Explicit bargaining problems can be modeled either as extensive-form noncooperative games 
or as cooperative games; tacit bargaining problems are modeled as normal-form noncooperative games.
2 Ellingsen and Östling (2010) offer an alternative model of the role of communication in coordinating expecta-
tions. This model uses level-k theory and assumes that, if otherwise indifferent between strategies, players prefer 
to send honest messages.
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the  preceding negotiation. So if it is common knowledge that tacit bargaining prob-
lems are resolved by the use of payoff-irrelevant cues, explicit communication may 
be redundant.
Our experiments are designed to test the robustness of Schelling’s hypothesis in a 
range of cheap-talk settings in which payoff-irrelevant cues sometimes support and 
sometimes oppose efficiency and equality. More precisely, we test whether, in the 
presence of a variety of trade-offs between efficiency and equality, the existence of 
a payoff-irrelevant cue that suggests a particular solution to a bargaining problem 
tends to shift the actual outcome in the direction of that solution.
It is important to understand what we mean when we say that some feature of a 
game is payoff-irrelevant. In game theory, players are assumed to have common 
knowledge of the payoffs that would result from each possible profile of strategies. 
A payoff-irrelevant feature provides no additional information about the payoffs that 
are associated with given strategy profiles. However, it may influence players’ strat-
egy choices (and hence the actual payoffs they derive from playing the game). In a 
game with two or more equilibria, a payoff-irrelevant feature may make one equi-
librium particularly salient, thus suggesting a solution to the problem of equilibrium 
selection. A commonly recognized solution to such a problem (whether suggested 
by payoff-irrelevant or payoff-based features of the game) is a focal point.
If an experimental test of Schelling’s hypothesis is to be adequately controlled, 
the cues to be investigated must be payoff-irrelevant, not only with respect to tra-
ditional game-theoretic assumptions about players’ utility functions, but also with 
respect to other recognized theories of utility. In particular, since subjects might 
have preferences for equality in experimental earnings (as proposed by Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999 and Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), those cues should not provide infor-
mation about the distribution of material payoffs between subjects for given strategy 
profiles—even if that information is irrelevant from the perspective of axiomatic 
bargaining theory under the assumption of self-interest. Thus, the design developed 
by Roth and Malouf (1979) and by Roth and Murnighan (1982), which investigates 
the effects on the outcomes of explicit bargaining games of varying information 
about the distribution of material payoffs, would not be suitable for our purposes. 
Nor should the cues to be investigated provide information about the players which 
might suggest differences in their moral entitlements to rewards. Thus, it would not 
be appropriate for us to use a design such as that of Gächter and Riedl (2005), which 
tests whether bargaining outcomes are influenced by players’ perceptions of “moral 
property rights,” induced by relative performance in a general knowledge quiz. We 
need an experimental environment in which the cues that discriminate between 
alternative bargaining outcomes are perceived by the players only as a device for 
selecting between equilibria, and not as a source of information about the subjective 
values of those equilibria. Our experiment is designed so that the relevant cues meet 
this requirement.
Our main findings are the following. Communication is highly effective in coordi-
nating players’ expectations. Across all games, we find a strong tendency for players 
to settle on the least unequal of the efficient payoff divisions, whether or not that 
division is suggested by payoff-irrelevant cues. But when no equal and efficient 
division is feasible, those cues often influence which of the least unequal divisions 
is selected, and hence which player gets the larger payoff.
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We begin by explaining the principal features of our design (in Section I) and by 
setting out formal hypotheses, in the spirit of Schelling’s analysis, that this design 
can test (Section II). We then describe the details of the main treatment used in the 
experiment (Section III) and report the results of our hypothesis tests (Section IV). 
Using a more inductive approach, we investigate the dynamics of bargaining and 
various other aspects of the bargaining process (Section V). We briefly describe 
a control treatment which tests the robustness of our method of representing the 
absence of salient payoff-irrelevant cues (Section VI). Finally, we draw general con-
clusions (Sections VII and VIII).
I. The Bargaining Table Design
Our experimental design was chosen with the following considerations in mind. 
We wanted a bargaining protocol which had the “feel” of a bargaining problem to 
the subjects who engaged in it. We wanted to allow bargainers to communicate with 
one another simply and freely, up to a fixed deadline, and to be able to make bind-
ing agreements during this period. We wanted to be able to introduce cues that were 
clearly payoff-irrelevant and yet would be perceived as a natural part of the bargain-
ing problem, rather than merely as extraneous labels. And we wanted to use cues 
that were known to work as focal points in tacit bargaining and pure coordination 
games, so that if we were to find that those cues were ineffective in our explicit bar-
gaining games, that finding could not be attributed to the cues being insufficiently 
salient.
Figure 1 shows the displays used in the 30 bargaining games that featured in our 
main treatment, labeled G1 to G30. Each game used a bargaining table format, sim-
ilar to that used by Isoni et al. (2013) to investigate tacit bargaining. Each bargaining 
table was a 9 × 9 grid on which were superimposed two colored squares, represent-
ing the players’ respective “bases,” and a number of “discs.” On each disc there was 
a number, denoting its money value (in UK pounds). The players communicated 
anonymously with one another through computer terminals. Each player’s screen 
showed the bargaining table, rotated so that her own base appeared at the bottom. 
On the screen, players were labeled as “you” (with a red base) and “other” (with a 
gray base) so that there was no commonly known asymmetry between their descrip-
tions. (For purposes of exposition, we will refer to the player whose base is on the 
left in Figure 1 as L, and the player on the right as R.) The players were invited to 
negotiate an agreement on how to divide the discs between them. The full text of the 
instructions is reproduced in the online Appendix.3
Negotiation took place continuously in real time, for a maximum of 90 seconds. 
At any time in this 90-second interval, either player could “claim” any disc by click-
ing on it with her mouse; any claim could be canceled at any time by a further click. 
Each player could claim as many discs as she wished. Discs could be claimed again 
3 The displays in Figure 1 show the bargaining tables before any rotation was applied. The figure contains the 
following features that were not part of the displays seen by participants. First, columns are numbered from −4 to 4 
from left to right, and rows are numbered from −4 to 4 from top to bottom. Second, in each game discs are labeled 
from  d 1 to  d n , where n is the number of discs in the game. These features are included to facilitate the reading of the 
datasets. Third, the bases are labeled “L” and “R” rather than “you” and “other.” Finally, disc values are shown with 
the omission of the “£” symbol (which was displayed in the experiment).
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Figure 1. The Games Used in the Main Treatment
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Figure 1. The Games Used in the Main Treatment (Continued)
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Figure 1. The Games Used in the Main Treatment (Continued)
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Figure 1. The Games Used in the Main Treatment (Continued)
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after claims had been canceled. Each player’s screen continuously showed both 
players’ current claims. Discs on which there were no current claims were shown in 
white. On each player’s screen, the discs she claimed turned red and were connected 
to her base by a red line; the discs claimed by the other player turned gray and were 
connected to the other person’s base by a gray line. When a disc was claimed by 
both players, it turned yellow and started to blink, while still connected to both bases 
by colored lines.
At any time, either player could report that she was willing to agree to the claims 
she and her coplayer currently made. This was done by ticking an “accept box.” 
Throughout the negotiation time, each player could see both her own box and her 
coplayer’s. An “accept” tick could be canceled at any time prior to an actual agree-
ment, and was automatically canceled if either player changed her claims. An agree-
ment was sealed if and when there was a tick in each player’s accept box. At this 
stage, if any disc was claimed by both players, each player’s payoff from the game 
was zero; otherwise, each player’s payoff was the total value of the discs she had 
claimed. If no agreement had been reached after 90 seconds, players’ payoffs were 
calculated as if they had agreed to the set of claims that was current when the time 
allowed for bargaining expired. This design feature allows coplayers to maintain 
conflicting claims right up to the final seconds of the game, while keeping open 
the possibility of achieving positive payoffs through a very late change of claims 
by one player. Such a concession would typically require only a few mouse clicks. 
Notice also that this bargaining protocol allows players to agree to leave some discs 
unclaimed by either of them, or to agree that both payoffs be zero.4 (A screenshot of 
the bargaining table is shown in the online Appendix.)
There are some significant differences between our bargaining protocol and 
those used by other researchers such as Roth and Murnighan (1982); Forsythe, 
Kennan, and Sopher (1991); and Gächter and Riedl (2005).5 One difference is that 
the mechanism for making claims in our design provides a structured language for 
nonbinding communication between the players, prior to their using the agreement 
mechanism. Because these “messages” are sent by mouse clicks and are immedi-
ately displayed on players’ screens in an intuitive way, they can be exchanged very 
quickly. A more important difference is that, in our protocol, players make claims 
on specific objects rather than proposing distributions of the total available payoff. 
One consequence of this feature is that a given profile of payoffs may be consistent 
with more than one set of claims, and so may set a coordination problem for two 
players who both want to arrive at those payoffs.6 (In G1, for example, there are two 
distinct sets of claims which imply that each player receives £5.) However, given 
4 Although the mechanisms of “claiming” and “accepting” do not provide a direct way of proposing that some 
discs should be claimed by neither player, there are indirect ways for a player to communicate that she wants an 
equal but inefficient agreement (for example, by claiming discs compatible with such an agreement and refusing to 
accept any unequal proposal from her coplayer).
5 In these designs, players submit proposals about how the available surplus should be divided; the sender of a 
proposal is committed to it if the other player accepts it. Players are also able to send free-form written messages, 
subject to certain constraints which require messages to be checked by an experimenter before being transmitted, 
thus requiring relatively long negotiation periods (10 minutes in Forsythe, Kennan, and Sopher’s; 12 minutes in 
Roth and Murnighan’s; 15 minutes in Gächter and Riedl’s).
6 Herreiner and Puppe (2010) use a bargaining protocol in which players propose divisions of a set of specific 
objects (described as “A,” “B,” “C,” and “D”), but in which given sets of objects can have different values for the 
two players. Values are assigned so that each division of the objects induces a unique payoff profile.
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the  communication opportunities provided by our protocol, one might expect such 
coordination problems to be easily solved. For our purposes, the principal advantage 
of linking claims with objects is that it allows us to use the spatial layout of discs as 
an intuitively natural cue.
We submit that these cues are payoff-irrelevant in the sense that is required for 
tests of Schelling’s hypothesis. We recognize that the layout of discs on the table 
could prompt mental associations with real-world situations in which there are 
transport costs that increase with distance, or in which taking closer rather than 
more distant objects is an apparently natural heuristic. But mental associations such 
as these are exactly what Schelling’s theory is about. Discussing the role of focal 
points in bargaining, Schelling says that what is perceived as the “obvious” outcome 
depends “on what analogies or precedents the definition of the bargaining issue calls 
to mind,” and that the mechanism that lies behind focality is “the power of sugges-
tion” (1960, pp. 69, 73, italics in original). From experiments on matching games, 
it is known that the labels which are focal are often those that are perceived as 
“favorites”—in other words, that prompt mental associations with subjective value 
(Bardsley et al. 2010). In the classic matching game of choosing a meeting place 
in New York City, the focality of Grand Central Station for Schelling’s respondents 
surely has something to do with associations of ideas with travel costs; in the 1950s, 
for residents of New Haven, CT traveling to New York City by train, Grand Central 
Station was presumably a cost-minimizing meeting place. It seems unavoidable 
that, in any fair test of Schelling’s theory, payoff-irrelevant cues will have asso-
ciations with real-world concepts of value, or with real-world precedents or habits. 
What is required (and our design achieves) is that the experiment uses labels that are 
 payoff-irrelevant: that is, they do not provide information about the actual payoffs 
of the game that subjects play, and that this fact is transparent.
In choosing the spatial layouts of discs for our bargaining games, our working 
assumption was that players would classify locations on the table as “closer to my 
base,” “closer to the other player’s base,” and “equidistant from the bases” (i.e., in 
the central column). Thus, in any given game, a natural association of closeness 
suggests that each player should claim the discs that are closer to her base. To the 
extent that these suggestions are acted on, a player has an advantage relative to her 
coplayer if the discs on her side of the table have a higher total money value than 
discs on the other player’s side. In such a case, we will say that the first player is 
favored.
This assumption is supported by evidence from matching games and tacit bar-
gaining games. Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994) investigate a type of match-
ing game in which two players each see the same diagram of a grid, similar to our 
bargaining tables, on which two squares and a number of circles are located. The 
players’ problem is to coordinate on an assignment of circles to squares (each circle 
being assigned to exactly one square). Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden find high rates of 
coordination in these games, and a strong tendency for players to assign each circle 
to the square (if there is one) to which it is closer. Isoni et al. (2013) find that, when 
tacit bargaining games are displayed as bargaining tables, spatial cues act as power-
ful focal points; players are much more likely to claim discs at their own side of the 
table than discs at the other side, even when the layout of discs favors one player 
relative to the other.
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In the light of this evidence, it is reasonable to expect that when explicit bargaining 
games are presented as bargaining tables, players will recognize (but not necessarily 
act on) spatial cues based on the relation of closeness between discs and bases. In 
any game in which there is at least one disc at each player’s side of the table, we will 
say that the spatial cues pick out the solution in which each player takes the discs at 
her side of the table, and no others. Games in which all the discs are in the central 
column (spatially neutral games) will be used as controls.7
In G4, for example, the spatial cues pick out the solution in which player L takes 
the £6 disc and player R takes the £5 disc. Notice that spatial cues may pick out 
solutions in which some discs are assigned to neither player. For example, the spa-
tial cues of G21 pick out the solution in which each player takes the £5 disc on her 
own side of the table, leaving the £1 disc in the central column unclaimed. The idea 
that cues can work in this way is consistent with Schelling’s (1960, pp. 295–297) 
discussion of games in which payoff-dominated equilibria are focal. It should also 
be remembered that if players have preferences for equality in money earnings, a 
solution that achieves equality by leaving some discs unclaimed can be non-domi-
nated in utility.
Our objective is to investigate how far, and under what conditions, actual bargain-
ing outcomes are skewed toward those solutions that are picked out by spatial cues. 
Such an investigation needs to take account of payoff-based factors which might 
complement or oppose spatial cues. Most theories of bargaining imply that bargain-
ing outcomes are influenced by principles of efficiency and equality. We therefore 
consider how those principles apply to our games.
Consider any bargaining table game with players L and R. If we abstract from 
spatial properties, the game is defined by a collection D of disc values. For example, 
G1 and G2 are both defined by D = {5, 5}.8 The specification of D determines which 
combinations of payoffs are feasible. We define an allocation ( w L ,  w R ) as a pair of 
payoffs to L and R respectively. Notice that an allocation is defined in terms of pay-
offs; when we need to refer to players’ final claims on the discs themselves, defined 
by their spatial locations, we will use the term assignment. An allocation is feasible 
if it would result from some assignment of discs to players that is consistent with the 
rules of the game. (Thus, if D = {5, 5}, the set of feasible allocations is {(0, 0), (0, 5), 
(0, 10), (5, 0), (5, 5), (10, 0)}.)
Now consider any feasible allocation ( w L ,  w R ) in a game in which the total value 
of the discs is v. The efficiency of this allocation is ( w L +  w R )/v; we will say the 
allocation is efficient if ( w L +  w R )/v = 1, and inefficient otherwise. The allocation 
is equal if  w L =  w R . Its worse consequence is min( w L ,  w R ). It is least-unequal effi-
cient (LUE) if it is efficient and if no efficient allocation has a strictly greater worse 
consequence. It is least-inefficient equal (LIE) if it is equal and if no equal allocation 
7 Notice that it is an intrinsic property of a bargaining table game that each disc has a distinct location. For this 
reason, it is impossible to remove every spatial cue from the game. But for the purposes of our tests of Schelling’s 
hypotheses, what matters is that the most salient spatial cues are those defined by the closeness relation embed-
ded in our design, and that these cues are absent from the games that are used as controls. As shown by Isoni et al. 
(2013), games in which all discs are equidistant from the two bases have much weaker spatial cues than games in 
which discs are split between the two halves of the table. An alternative form of control, in which spatial neutrality 
is defined by the absence of bases, will be considered in Section VI.
8 A “collection,” unlike a set, can contain two or more identical items. Thus, for example, {5, 5} and {5} are 
distinct collections.
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gives greater payoffs to both players. It is equal and efficient (EE) if it is both LUE 
and LIE. Intuition suggests that, in the absence of payoff-irrelevant cues, LUE and 
LIE allocations are particularly likely to be perceived as focal. The games used in 
our experiment were chosen to represent different relationships between the alloca-
tion picked out by spatial cues (the SC allocation) and the LUE and LIE allocations.
Our bargaining table design imposes certain constraints on the sets of feasible 
allocations that can be represented, and hence on the efficiency/equality trade-offs 
that can be investigated. One constraint is that, for any payoffs x and y, (x, y) is fea-
sible if and only if (y, x) is feasible; the payoff opportunities available to the players 
are always symmetrical. A second constraint is that if the LIE allocation is inef-
ficient, it must be weakly dominated by each of the LUE allocations. For example, 
consider a game with v = 11 in which (4, 4) is LIE. Then there must be one or 
more discs worth three in total that are “left on the table” if (4, 4) is reached, which 
implies that (7, 4) and (4, 7) are also feasible. A third constraint is that if (x, y) and 
(y, x) are LUE with x > 2y, there must be a disc worth exactly x which is left on the 
table in any equal allocation, and so the LIE payoff to each player cannot be greater 
than y/2 (with the implication that the LIE allocation is strictly dominated by the 
LUE allocations).9 Subject to these constraints, we investigate the effects of spatial 
cues in relation to a range of different efficiency/equality trade-offs.
II. Hypotheses
Table 1 summarizes the 30 games used in the main treatment, classifying them in 
relation to the hypotheses that are to be tested.
In this table, and in the rest of the paper, we use the following compact notation 
to describe bargaining table games. For any given game, we list its disc values (in 
UK pounds). Two vertical lines are added to the list to show the main features of the 
spatial layout. Discs located in the left (right) columns of the bargaining table are 
listed to the left (right) of both vertical lines; discs in the central column are listed 
between the vertical lines. So, for example, G1 = |5, 5| is a game in which there 
are two discs worth £5 each, both located in the central column. G18 = 2, 1| |4, 4 
is a game in which there are four discs,  d 1 and  d 2 on the left, worth £2 and £1 
respectively, and  d 3 and  d 4 on the right, both worth £4—in this game R is favored. 
G12 = 2, 1, 2|1|2, 2, 1 is a game in which there are seven discs, three on the left, 
worth £2, £1, and £2, one in the central column, worth £1, and three on the right, 
worth £2, £2, and £1.
Each row of Table 1 refers to a set of games that use a common disc collection, and 
therefore differ only in terms of the spatial layout of the discs. The entry in the first 
column of each row identifies the relevant disc collection. The entries in the second 
and third columns record the LUE and LIE allocations for this set of games. For each 
disc collection, there is one spatially neutral game, identified in the fourth column, and 
one or more games with spatial cues. The latter games are identified in the remaining 
9 Suppose (x, y) and (y, x) are LUE with x > 2y. First, suppose there is no disc worth exactly x. Then in any 
(x, y) allocation, player L must be assigned at least two discs, and the lowest-valued of these discs must be worth 
no more than x/2. But if this disc is transferred from L to R, the resulting (efficient) allocation is less unequal than 
(x, y), contradicting the assumption that (x, y) is LUE. So there must be a disc worth exactly x. Since this disc is 
worth more than all the others combined, it must be left on the table in an equal allocation.
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four columns, classified according to the allocations that are picked out by those cues. 
Each of these games allows us to test some hypothesis about the role of spatial cues 
in explicit bargaining. These hypotheses are concerned with average or aggregate out-
comes of given bargaining table games that are faced by many pairs of players.
The “EE” column identifies games in which an EE allocation is picked out by spa-
tial cues. These games allow us to test our background assumption that the spatial 
relation between discs and bases is perceived as salient. Because of the symmetry 
embedded in our design, any feasible EE allocation can be arrived at by at least two 
(and sometimes many more) different assignments of discs to players. If spatial cues 
were salient, one would expect the assignments suggested by those cues to be cho-
sen more frequently than other assignments that implied the same allocations. This 
can be tested most cleanly in games in which payoff-based criteria make one alloca-
tion uniquely focal, and spatial cues pick out one particular assignment consistent 
with that allocation. We therefore test the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: In any bargaining table game in which there is an EE allocation 
picked out by spatial cues, the disc assignment suggested by those cues occurs more 
frequently than any other assignment which implies the same allocation.
The “LUE, not equal” and “Efficient, not LUE” columns of Table 1 respectively 
identify two types of game in which the spatial cues pick out unequal but effi-
cient allocations. In games of the first type, there are two LUE allocations, differ-
ing according to which player gets the higher payoff, and the spatial cues pick out 
one of these allocations. These games span a range of different trade-offs between 
efficiency and equality. The difference between the two players’ LUE payoffs var-
ies from £1 in G4, G13, G17, and G20 to £5 in G6 and G29. In G4 and G6, the 
only equal allocation is that in which both players receive nothing. In G17, the LIE 
allocation gives positive payoffs but is strictly dominated by the LUE allocations. 
In G13, G20, G23, G26, and G29, the LIE allocation is only weakly dominated 
by the LUE allocations, making the trade-off as favorable as possible to equality. 
Recall that if (x, y) is an LUE allocation and if x > 2y, the LIE allocation is strictly 
Table 1— Summary of the Games Used in the Experiment
Spatial cues pick out:
Disc collection LUE LIE
Spatially 
neutral EE
LUE, 
not equal
Efficient, 
not LUE
LIE, 
not efficient
{5, 5} (5, 5) (5, 5) (5, 5) G1 = |5, 5| G2 = 5| |5 — — —
{1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1} (5, 5) (5, 5) (5, 5) G7 = 
|1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1|
G8 = 
2, 2, 1| |1, 2, 2
— G9 = 
2, 1, 1| |2, 2, 2
G10 = 
2, 1| |1, 2, 2, 2
—
{5, 6} (5, 6) (6, 5) (0, 0) G3 = |5, 6| — G4 = 6| |5 — —
{5, 1, 5} (5, 6) (6, 5) (5, 5) G19 = |5, 1, 5| — G20 = 1, 5| |5 — G21 = 5|1|5
{4, 2, 1, 4} (5, 6) (6, 5) (4, 4) G15 = |4, 2, 1, 4| — G17 = 
2, 4| |4, 1
G18 = 
2, 1| |4, 4
G16 = 4|2, 1|4
{1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1} (5, 6) (6, 5) (5, 5) G11 = 
|1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1|
— G13 = 
2, 1, 2, 1| |2, 2, 1
G14 = 
2, 2, 2, 2| |1, 1, 1
G12 = 
2, 1, 2|1|2, 2, 1 
{4, 2, 4} (4, 6) (6, 4) (4, 4) G22 = |4, 2, 4| — G23 = 4| |4, 2 — G24 = 4|2|4
{4, 3, 4} (4, 7) (7, 4) (4, 4) G25 = |4, 3, 4| — G26 = 3, 4| |4 — G27 = 4|3|4
{3, 8} (3, 8) (8, 3) (0, 0) G5 = |3, 8| — G6 = 8| |3 — —
{5, 5, 5} (5, 10) (10, 5) (5, 5) G28 = |5, 5, 5| — G29 = 5| |5, 5 — G30 = 5|5|5
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 dominated by the LUE allocations. Thus, when the dominance is only weak, the x:y 
ratio cannot be greater than 2:1. This ratio ranges from 6:5 in G13 to the maximum 
value of 2:1 in G29. The “efficient, not LUE” column identifies games in which the 
spatial cues pick out an efficient allocation that is more than minimally unequal.
For games in which spatial cues pick out unequal but efficient allocations, we test 
the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: In any bargaining table game in which spatial cues pick out an 
unequal but efficient allocation, payoffs are higher for favored players than for 
unfavored players.
This hypothesis encapsulates a key difference between Schelling’s analysis of 
explicit bargaining and analyses that take no account of payoff-irrelevant cues. 
Whatever the number and value of discs on the table, the only asymmetries between 
the players are the result of spatial cues. (Recall that the players have not been 
given any commonly known labels, and that each player is free to claim any disc.) 
Thus, if play is not influenced by spatial cues, there can be no systematic difference 
between the payoffs of favored and unfavored players. In contrast, it is fundamental 
to Schelling’s analysis that payoff-irrelevant cues can confer a bargaining advantage 
on one player relative to another.
One might think that Schelling’s approach also implies that, when spatial cues 
pick out an LUE allocation, bargaining outcomes will tend to be more efficient than 
in the corresponding spatially neutral game. However, the role of cues in explicit 
bargaining can be modeled in ways that imply Hypothesis 2 while not implying that 
the presence of cues increases efficiency. A simple model of this kind, based on the 
asymmetric Hawk-Dove game (Smith and Parker 1976; Sugden 2005), is presented 
in the online Appendix. The essential idea behind the model is that players may be 
spatially aware or spatially blind. Spatially blind players follow strategies that are 
independent of cues. Such players are of two types—tough bargainers (“hawks”) 
and soft bargainers (“doves”). Spatially aware players act as hawks when they are 
favored and as doves when they are not. Whatever the mix of these three types, pro-
vided that there are at least some spatially aware players, average payoffs are strictly 
higher for favored than for unfavored players. For some parameter values, however, 
the interplay of the two types induces less agreement and hence lower efficiency in 
games with spatial cues than in spatially neutral games.
The final column of Table 1 identifies games in which spatial cues pick out an 
allocation that is LIE (with nonzero payoffs) but inefficient. The value of the discs 
that must be left unclaimed in order to achieve this allocation varies from £1 in 
G12 and G21 to £5 in G30. For these games, we test the hypothesis that bargaining 
outcomes are skewed in the direction of equality. In this case, the predicted effect of 
cues is symmetrical with respect to the players, and so “skew” has to be defined by 
reference to spatially neutral games. Our final hypothesis is therefore:
HYPOTHESIS 3: Let G be any bargaining table game in which the LIE allocation 
is inefficient, gives nonzero payoffs, and is picked out by spatial cues. Let G′ be a 
spatially neutral game with the same disc collection as G. The probability that the 
outcome is the LIE allocation is higher for G than for G′.
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III. Implementation of the Experiment
The main treatment was first run as a series of sessions in which subjects faced 
games G1–G18, which we call Set I. In the light of the results from those games, 
we extended the study to a wider class of games with a greater variety of trade-offs 
between efficiency and equality. We ran a further set of sessions in which subjects 
faced G19–G30 and (as a consistency check) G1–G6, making up Set II.
Each subject played the relevant 18 games in random order, not always with the 
same opponent, taking the favored role in some games and the unfavored role in 
others.10 Each participant was anonymously assigned to a matching group of four 
subjects, and for each game her opponent was chosen from the other three people 
in her group. This was known to the subject, but the matching sequence was varied 
so that subjects did not know which member of their group was their coplayer in 
any given game. Given the number of games to be played, it was infeasible to match 
subjects in a way that would allow each pair in any given game to be treated as an 
independent observation. Thus, to allow clean statistical tests with an acceptable 
degree of power, it was necessary to match subjects within small fixed groups and to 
use matching groups as the units of observation. Partner matching (i.e., a group size 
of two) would have introduced the possibility that pairs might try to equalize aver-
age payoffs over the 18 games, for example by alternating which player would get 
the larger share of the surplus. We judged that, with a group size of four and with no 
opportunities for free-form communication, group-level cooperation across games 
would be difficult to sustain. However, it is possible that the use of matching groups 
could have induced subjects to bargain less aggressively than they would have done 
in one-shot games.
We used a variant of the random lottery incentive system. Each subject was paid 
her payoffs in 2 of the 18 games, chosen at random by the computer. This selection 
procedure was subject to the constraints that both players in a pair were paid for the 
same game and that each player in a matching group appeared in two of the selected 
pairs.
The main treatment was run in June 2010 (for Set I) and November 2012 (for 
Set II) at the CBESS Experimental Laboratory at the University of East Anglia. 
Participants were recruited from the general student population using the ORSEE 
system (Greiner 2004), excluding individuals who participated in previous bargain-
ing table experiments. There were 144 subjects in the Set I sessions and 168 in the 
Set II sessions; no one participated in both. The bargaining protocol was imple-
mented using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Subjects’ understanding of this protocol 
and other key aspects of the experiment was checked using a computerized ques-
tionnaire (which can be found in the online Appendix). Sessions lasted between 60 
and 80 minutes; earnings ranged between £5 and £25 with an average of £15.12, 
including a £5 show-up fee.
10 For each of the games in which spatial cues favor one of the players, which player was favored was determined 
randomly. Given our matching protocol (see below), it would not have been possible for individual subjects to be 
assigned the same role for all of these games.
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IV. Results: Bargaining Outcomes
The outcomes of bargaining in the main treatment are summarized in Tables 2A 
(for Set I) and 2B (for Set II).
In each table, there is a row for each game in the relevant set. The empty lines sep-
arate groups of games which have a common disc collection. The first game in each 
of these groups is spatially neutral; the others have various kinds of spatial cues.
The first column describes the game in our compact notation. The second column 
reports average efficiency—that is, the average value of ( w L +  w R )/v achieved by 
the 72 player pairs facing Set I or the 84 player pairs facing Set II. The following 
columns report the percentage of pairs whose payoffs constituted: an efficient allo-
cation (column 3); an equal allocation with nonzero payoffs (column 4);11 and an 
LUE allocation (column 5). For games with spatial cues, column 6 reports the per-
centage of pairs whose payoffs constituted the SC allocation. Since this allocation 
is implied by two or more different assignments of discs to players, the percentage 
of pairs in which each player’s final claims were exactly the discs assigned to her 
11 In every case in which a pair achieved an equal allocation with nonzero payoffs, that allocation was also LIE. 
We therefore do not report LIE outcomes separately.
Table 2A—Results for Set I in Main Treatment
Game description
Average 
efficiency 
Percent 
efficient
Percent 
equal 
Percent 
LUE
Percent SC 
(SC claims)
Percent 
disag. (expl.) NPAa,b
G1 = |5, 5| 0.986 98.6 98.6 98.6 — 1.4 (0) —
G2 = 5| |5 0.986 98.6 98.6 98.6 98.6 (84.7) 1.4 (1.4) —
G3 = |5, 6| 0.958 95.8 — 94.4 — 4.2 (1.4) —
G4 = 6| |5 0.972 97.2 — 97.2 58.3 (58.3) 2.8 (1.4) 0.194*
G5 = |3, 8| 0.802 79.2 — 79.2 — 19.4 (2.8) —
G6 = 8| |3 0.760 75.0 — 73.6 38.9 (38.9) 23.6 (6.9) 0.033
G7 = |1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1| 0.983 97.2 87.5 87.5 — 1.4 (0) —
G8 = 2, 2, 1| |1, 2, 2 0.981 94.4 87.5 87.5 87.5 (70.8) 1.4 (0) —
G9 = 2, 1, 1| |2, 2, 2 0.958 95.8 79.2 79.2 12.5 (9.7) 4.2 (0) 0.125**
G10 = 2, 1| |1, 2, 2, 2 0.983 95.8 81.9 81.9 0 (0) 1.4 (0) 0.035
G11 = |1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1| 0.984 97.2 0.0 95.8 — 1.4 (0) —
G12 = 2, 1, 2|1|2, 2, 1 0.986 98.6 0.0 94.4 0 (0) 1.4 (0) —
G13 = 2, 1, 2, 1| |2, 2, 1 0.943 93.1 1.4 88.9 51.4 (38.9) 5.6 (0) 0.097
G14 = 2, 2, 2, 2| |1, 1, 1 0.915 90.3 1.4 87.5 0 (0) 8.3 (1.4) 0.036*
G15 = |4, 2, 1, 4| 0.971 95.8 0.0 94.4 — 2.8 (2.8) —
G16 = 4|2, 1|4 0.944 94.4 0.0 87.5 0 (0) 5.6 (2.8) —
G17 = 2, 4| |4, 1 0.957 94.4 0.0 93.1 68.1 (63.9) 4.2 (0) 0.528***
G18 = 2, 1| |4, 4 0.956 94.4 0.0 94.4 0 (0) 4.2 (0) 0.047**
Notes:
a Normalized payoff asymmetry, NPA = ( w F −  w U )/( w F ∗ −  w U ∗ ), where  w F and  w U are means of actual earnings of 
favored and unfavored players respectively, and  w F 
∗ and  w U ∗ are earnings of favored and unfavored players in the 
SC allocation.
b Significance level in one-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank test of comparison of payoffs to favored and to unfavored play-
ers averaging within matching groups.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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by the spatial cues—the SC claims—is shown in parentheses. Column 7 reports 
the percentage of pairs whose interactions12 ended with the allocation (0, 0). The 
percentage of cases in which this was the result of a sealed agreement is shown 
in parentheses. The final column reports an index of normalized payoff asymmetry 
(NPA). This is defined as ( w F −  w U )/( w F ∗ −  w U ∗ ), where  w F and  w U are the aver-
age payoffs to favored and unfavored players respectively, and  w F 
∗ and  w U ∗ are the 
payoffs implied by the SC allocation. Thus, normalized payoff asymmetry is equal 
to one if all pairs settle on the SC allocation, and has an expected value of zero if 
players’ behavior is unaffected by spatial cues. The asterisks against entries in this 
column will be explained later.
It is immediately obvious from a comparison of the two tables that, in each game 
that was common to Sets I and II, behavior was very similar in the two cases.13 
12 We use the term “interaction” to refer to the course of play in a particular game (e.g., G1, G2, etc.) faced by 
a particular pair of players.
13 For each of these games, we test the null hypothesis that the distributions of earnings do not differ between 
the Set I and Set II sessions by comparing the group-level averages with two-tail Mann-Whitney tests. For games 
with spatial cues, we conduct similar tests on the earnings of favored and unfavored players. The hypothesis is never 
rejected. See the online Appendix for details.
Table 2B—Results for Set II in Main Treatment
Game description
Average 
efficiency 
Percent 
efficient
Percent 
equal 
Percent 
LUE
Percent SC 
(SC claims)
Percent 
disag. (expl.) NPAa,b
G1 = |5, 5| 1.000 100.0 100.0 100.0 — 0 (0) —
G2 = 5| |5 1.000 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 (88.1) 0 (0) —
G3 = |5, 6| 0.976 97.6 — 97.6 — 2.4 (0) —
G4 = 6| |5 0.964 96.4 — 96.4 69 (69) 3.6 (1.2) 0.417***
G5 = |3, 8| 0.782 77.4 — 77.4 — 21.4 (3.6) —
G6 = 8| |3 0.759 75.0 — 75.0 42.9 (42.9) 23.8 (6) 0.088
G19 = |5, 1, 5| 0.968 88.1 9.5 86.9 — 2.4 (1.2) —
G20 = 1, 5| |5 0.958 89.3 7.1 86.9 48.8 (41.7) 3.6 (2.4) −0.107
G21 = 5|1|5 0.962 86.9 9.5 86.9 9.5 (7.1) 2.4 (1.2) —
G22 = |4, 2, 4| 0.886 76.2 15.5 76.2 — 8.3 (2.4) —
G23 = 4| |4, 2 0.888 77.4 14.3 76.2 44 (38.1) 8.3 (1.2) 0.083
G24 = 4|2|4 0.867 76.2 13.1 76.2 13.1 (11.9) 10.7 (4.8) —
G25 = |4, 3, 4| 0.838 78.6 7.1 78.6 — 14.3 (1.2) —
G26 = 3, 4| |4 0.872 82.1 6.0 78.6 51.2 (46.4) 10.7 (4.8) 0.214**
G27 = 4|3|4 0.805 76.2 6.0 75.0 6 (6) 17.9 (1.2) —
G28 = |5, 5, 5| 0.802 76.2 6.0 76.2 — 17.9 (4.8) —
G29 = 5| |5, 5 0.885 82.1 9.5 82.1 34.5 (32.1) 8.3 (2.4) −0.131
G30 = 5|5|5 0.845 77.4 10.7 77.4 10.7 (4.8) 11.9 (4.8) —
Notes:
a Normalized payoff asymmetry, NPA = ( w F −  w U )/( w F ∗ −  w U ∗ ), where  w F and  w U are means of actual earnings of 
favored and unfavored players respectively, and  w F 
∗ and  w U ∗ are earnings of favored and unfavored players in the 
SC allocation.
b Significance level in one-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank test of comparison of payoffs to favored and to unfavored play-
ers averaging within matching groups.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
3274 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW OCTObER 2014
Thus, although our formal hypothesis tests will be carried out separately for the two 
sets, it is reasonable to interpret the results as if they had been generated by two 
samples from the same subject pool.
A. Spatially Neutral Games
We begin by looking at the outcome of bargaining in spatially neutral games. These 
provide a natural benchmark from which to assess the effect of  payoff-irrelevant 
cues in other games.
In the games in which an EE allocation was feasible (i.e., G1 and G7), most 
pairs agreed on equal and efficient assignments of discs. Average efficiency in these 
games was very high, varying from 98.3 to 100 percent. Clearly, when trade-offs 
do not have to be made between equality and efficiency, the type of communication 
allowed by our bargaining protocol enables players to solve the problem of coordi-
nating their disc claims. For this, spatial cues are not needed.
In the games in which an EE allocation was not feasible, average efficiency was 
negatively related to the degree of inequality of the LUE allocations. When the LUE 
allocations were (5, 6) and (6, 5), average efficiency varied from 95.8 to 98.4 per-
cent. Its lowest value was 78.2 percent in G5 in Set II, where the LUE allocations 
were (3, 8) and (8, 3). But in all games, a large majority of interactions ended with 
LUE allocations, even when equal allocations with nonzero payoffs were feasible. 
In G25, for example, the LUE allocations were (4, 7) and (7, 4), while (4, 4) was 
also feasible; 66 out of 84 pairs (78.6 percent) settled on one of the LUE alloca-
tions, while only 6 (7.1 percent) settled on (4, 4). The overall picture is clear: in 
the absence of spatial cues, there was a very strong tendency for players to agree on 
LUE allocations.
When the LUE allocations were (5, 6) and (6, 5), the percentage of interactions 
ending with zero payoffs to both players ranged from 1.4 to 4.2. When the LUE 
allocations were more unequal than this, that percentage ranged from 8.3 to 21.3. 
These figures are broadly in line with the disagreement rates found in other experi-
mental investigations of unstructured bargaining.14 It is difficult to make meaningful 
comparisons across experiments with very different designs and payoff parameters, 
but our bargaining protocol does not seem significantly more or less likely to induce 
agreement than those that have been used by other researchers.
B. Games in Which Spatial Cues Pick Out Equal and Efficient Allocations
There are two games, G2 and G8, in which spatial cues pick out EE allocations. 
These games allow tests of Hypothesis 1. Given our findings for the corresponding 
spatially neutral games, it is not surprising that in G2 and G8, most pairs agreed on 
14 For example, Roth and Murnighan (1982, Table IV) find a disagreement rate of 16.7 percent when (as in our 
experiment) players’ payoffs are common knowledge. Forsythe, Kennan, and Sopher (1991, Table 2) investigate 
bargaining games with imperfect information. In the treatment (“IV”) in which imperfect information is least likely 
to impede agreement, the disagreement rate is 9.9 percent. Gächter and Riedl (2005, Table 3) find an average dis-
agreement rate of 18.2 percent in an experiment in which an unequal allocation is framed as respecting “moral prop-
erty rights.” Herreiner and Puppe (2010, Table 6) find an average disagreement rate of 4.7 percent in games with 
“cardinal” payoffs; in the game with the most severe efficiency/equality trade-off (“R3”), the rate is 10.4 percent.
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equal and efficient allocations. But we can ask whether, in reaching those alloca-
tions, players made use of spatial cues.
To test Hypothesis 1, we consider the number of pairs whose final claims were 
exactly those suggested by the spatial cues (corresponding with the entry in 
 parentheses in column 6 of Table 2A or 2B for the relevant game) as a proportion 
of the number of pairs who achieved the SC allocation (the main entry in the same 
column). Our null hypothesis is that players are equally likely to make any set of 
final claims with the same total value; the alternative hypothesis is that the set of 
final claims suggested by the cues (the SC claims) is made with higher probability 
than other claims with the same total value. In G2, there are two possible ways in 
which the (5, 5) allocation can be achieved: when both players claim the disc closer 
to them, as suggested by the spatial cues, and when both claim the further disc. In 
Set I, 61 of the 71 pairs who settled on the (5, 5) allocation selected the SC claims. 
In Set II, this was true for 74 out of 84 pairs. In G8, there are 12 possible ways in 
which the (5, 5) allocation can be achieved; 51 of the 63 pairs who settled on this 
allocation selected the SC claims. In each case, the null hypothesis is decisively 
rejected in a χ2 test of goodness of fit for a binomial distribution ( p < 0.0001).15 
This finding confirms our background assumption that the cues that were built into 
our experimental design would be perceived as salient by players.
C. Games in Which Spatial Cues Pick Out Unequal LUE Allocations
There are eight games (G4, G6, G13, G17, G20, G23, G26, and G29) in which 
spatial cues pick out one of two unequal LUE allocations. Two of these games (G4 
and G6) appeared in both Set I and Set II. In each of these ten cases, the level of 
average efficiency and the proportion of pairs who settled on LUE allocations were 
similar to the values observed in the corresponding spatially neutral game. In each 
case, there is no significant difference in average group earnings between the spa-
tially neutral game and the game in which spatial cues pick out one of the unequal 
LUE allocations.16
For the reasons explained in Section II, the similarity in efficiency need not be 
interpreted as evidence against Schelling’s hypothesis. It is more important to ask 
whether, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, payoffs were higher for favored than for 
unfavored players. For each of these ten cases, normalized payoff asymmetry is 
shown in the final column of Table 2A or 2B. NPA is positive in eight of these cases. 
To test for significant payoff asymmetry in the direction implied by Hypothesis 2, 
we use a one-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank test, comparing average payoffs to favored 
and unfavored players and using matching groups as the unit of observation. The 
results of this test are shown by the asterisks in the final columns of the tables. There 
is significant payoff asymmetry in four cases—G4 in Set I ( p < 0.1), and G4 in 
Set II ( p < 0.01), G17 ( p < 0.01), and G26 ( p < 0.05).
15 This test takes into account the fact that each of these games was played by two pairs in each matching group.
16 These comparisons are based on two-tail Wilcoxon signed-rank tests which use the matching groups as the 
unit of observation.
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These results suggest that when spatial cues pick out one of two LUE allocations, 
there is some tendency for bargaining outcomes to be skewed in the direction sug-
gested by those cues, but this tendency is relatively weak.
D. Games in Which Spatial Cues Pick Out Efficient Allocations That Are Not LUE
There are four games (G9, G10, G14, and G18) in which spatial cues pick out 
an efficient allocation that is not LUE. Given the high frequency of LUE alloca-
tions in the corresponding spatially neutral games, these games provide a test of the 
power of spatial cues to induce gratuitous inequality—that is, inequality beyond 
the minimum necessary for efficiency. Efficiency levels are very similar to the spa-
tially neutral games, and the distributions of earnings are not statistically different, 
with the exception of G14, in which a marginally significant decrease in earnings 
is observed ( p < 0.1). The proportion of pairs who settled on LUE allocations was 
also not significantly different.17
Very few of these interactions ended with the specific allocations suggested by the 
spatial cues. In G9 only seven pairs settled on the suggested (4, 6) allocation, with 
two pairs settling on the opposite (6, 4) allocation. In all other cases, in which the 
suggested distributions were more unequal—(3, 7), (8, 3), and (3, 8) in G10, G14, 
and G18, respectively—none of the 72 pairs settled on the SC allocation.
However, this does not mean that spatial cues had no distributional effects in these 
games. Just as in the games considered in Section IVC, we can measure NPA and 
can test Hypothesis 2. In all four games, NPA was positive. Payoff asymmetry was 
significant in G9 ( p < 0.05), G18 ( p < 0.05), and G14 ( p < 0.1). In G14 and G18, 
virtually all agreements were LUE (65 out of 66 in G14, 68 out of 69 in G18); the 
effect of spatial cues was to discriminate between the two LUE allocations to the 
advantage of the favored player. In G9, in which an EE allocation was available, 
57 of the 69 agreements were on that allocation, but the non-EE agreements were 
skewed to the advantage of the favored player.
These results suggest that spatial cues have little or no power to induce gratuitous 
inequality. But they provide additional evidence that, when efficiency is incompat-
ible with equality, asymmetric spatial cues can influence the distribution of payoffs.
E. Games in Which Spatial Cues Pick Out Inefficient LIE Allocations
There are six games (G12, G16, G21, G24, G27, and G30) in which spatial 
cues pick out an allocation that is LIE but not efficient. These games allow tests 
of Hypothesis 3—that spatial cues of this kind increase the probability that players 
settle on the LIE allocation.
In all six games, LIE allocations (shown in column 6 of Tables 2A and 2B) were 
very infrequent. The highest percentage of LIE allocations was 13.1 percent in G24; 
there were no such allocations in G12 or G16. In only one of the six games was 
the frequency of LIE allocations greater than in the corresponding spatially neutral 
game. (This is G30, in which 9 out of 84 pairs settled on the LIE allocation. In G28, 
17 More details on these tests can be found in the online Appendix.
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the corresponding spatially neutral game, the LIE allocation was achieved by 5 out 
of 84 pairs.) Clearly, our results give no support to Hypothesis 3.
V. Results: Bargaining Dynamics, Cross-Group Variation, and Learning Effects
In this section, we go beyond the testing of prior hypotheses about bargaining out-
comes. Using an inductive approach, we seek insights into the causal mechanisms 
that generated those outcomes. Because of space constraints, we provide only a 
summary of our findings; further details are given in the online Appendix.
A. Time Spent Reaching Agreement
We begin by looking at the time that pairs spent in trying to reach agreement.
For any given interaction, we define bargaining duration as the time that elapsed 
before an agreement was sealed, or as 90 seconds if no agreement was sealed before 
the deadline. For each game G1–G6 which appears in both Set I and Set II, there is 
no significant difference between the cumulative distributions of bargaining dura-
tion in the two cases.18 More surprisingly, there is very little evidence that bargain-
ing duration was affected by the presence or absence of spatial cues.19
While bargaining duration is a convenient metric to use in conducting statistical 
tests, a plot of the cumulative distribution of bargaining duration does not allow us 
to see some interesting aspects of the bargaining process. Recall that our bargaining 
protocol did not require players to tick their accept boxes in order for their payoffs to 
be determined by the claims on the table at 90 seconds. In fact, it was not uncommon 
for interactions to end with no sealed agreement, but with claims that gave a nonzero 
payoff to one or both players. This was the case for 113 interactions (8.7 percent) 
in Set I and 336 interactions (22.2 percent) in Set II. Significantly, however, almost 
all of these interactions (103 in Set I, 310 in Set II) were ones in which at least one 
player changed her claims in the final five seconds of the interaction. It is natural 
to interpret these cases as ones in which the players had effectively agreed, but the 
change of claims that immediately preceded that agreement occurred so close to the 
deadline that the players did not have time to tick their accept boxes. (This inter-
pretation is supported by the fact that, as we will show later, a high proportion of 
sealed agreements were reached in the final seconds.) Bargaining duration does not 
distinguish between these cases and interactions that ended with the players making 
conflicting claims.
18 Between-subject comparisons between cumulative distributions of bargaining durations are based on the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Since our matching protocol entails that the same individual may be part of two differ-
ent pairs in the two games used for these comparisons, we conduct the tests on the average bargaining duration for 
each game computed over the two pairs belonging to the same group of four players. This reduces the sample size 
to 36 and 42 observations for each comparison in Sets I and II, respectively, but ensures that each observation refers 
to the same group of individuals.
19 Cross-game comparisons between cumulative distributions of bargaining durations are based on two-tail 
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Significant differences in bargaining duration between games with spatial cues and 
corresponding spatially neutral games were found only for G8, G21, and G26. In all three cases, the presence of 
spatial cues shortened bargaining duration. For each game with spatial cues, we also compared the frequency of 
“profitable agreements” (i.e., interactions ending with a positive payoff for at least one player) with that in the cor-
responding spatially neutral game, and we found no significant difference.
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Since sealed agreements on (0, 0) allocations were very infrequent (see Tables 2A 
and 2B), little is lost by focusing on profitable agreements, defined as the outcomes 
of interactions in which at least one player’s payoff was nonzero. We will say that 
such agreements were either implicit or explicit. A (profitable) agreement was 
explicit if it was sealed within the 90 seconds available for bargaining, in which case 
the agreement time is the time, in seconds from the start of the interaction, when it 
was sealed. Thus, if an interaction ended without a sealed agreement but with a posi-
tive payoff for at least one player, this constitutes an implicit agreement. We arbi-
trarily assign an agreement time of 95 seconds to implicit agreements to distinguish 
them from agreements sealed at exactly 90 seconds.
Figures 2A and 2B report the cumulative distributions of agreement times for 
Sets I and II, respectively, averaging across games with the same disc collection.20 
Because of our conventions, the last point of each curve represents the net effect 
of implicit agreements, while the vertical distance between the last point and the 
100 percent boundary represents the percentage of (0, 0) allocations (including the 
few cases in which such allocations resulted from sealed agreements).
Notice that, in both figures, the graph for G1–G2 is an outlier: in these games, 
over 85 percent of pairs sealed agreements in the first ten seconds. It seems that 
20 Distributions of agreement time are very similar for games with the same disc collection (compare footnote 19).
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players recognized that, when there are only two discs and both have the same value, 
neither player can credibly hold out for anything other than the EE allocation, and 
so the problem reduces to that of coordinating on who takes which disc. That most 
pairs were able to resolve this problem in a few seconds, even in the absence of spa-
tial cues, is evidence of the transparency and flexibility of our bargaining protocol. 
Agreement times are also relatively short for G7–G10, the other set of games in 
which an EE allocation is feasible.
The remaining graphs all refer to games in which there are two unequal LUE 
allocations. These graphs show several suggestive regularities.
First, other things being equal, agreement times are longer for games in which 
LUE allocations are more unequal. (In Figure 2A, for example, the graphs for 
G3–G4, G11–G14, and G15–G18—where the LUE allocations are (5, 6) and 
(6, 5)—are almost everywhere above the graph for G5–G6, where the LUE alloca-
tions are (3, 8) and (8, 3).) Given that most pairs settled on LUE allocations, this 
effect should not be surprising. When LUE allocations are unequal, agreement on 
one such allocation requires one player to concede the larger payoff to the other; the 
greater the inequality, the greater the concession that has to be made.
Second, other things being equal, agreement times are longer for games with 
more discs. This is as one would expect; the more discs there are, the more time 
needs to be spent making claims, and the greater the variety of messages that can be 
transmitted in the “language” of claims.
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Third, and we suggest most important, all the graphs show the same three phases 
of agreement behavior, occurring in the same time intervals. The rate at which agree-
ments are made is relatively high from 0 seconds to about 30 seconds. From then to 
about 80 seconds, this rate levels off, before increasing steeply in the final seconds 
of the interaction. Similar “deadline effects” have been found in other unstructured 
bargaining experiments (e.g., Roth, Murnighan, and Schoumaker 1988; Gneezy, 
Haruvy, and Roth 2003; Gächter and Riedl 2005, 2006), and are consistent with 
the backward-induction logic of both Schelling’s and Farrell’s models of bargaining 
(see Introduction). The high rate of agreement in the first phase is more surprising, 
given that, in all phases of the game, most agreements were on one or other of the 
LUE allocations and that (as we will show later) failures to agree were usually the 
result of both players holding out for the higher LUE payoff. The implication is that 
any player could be reasonably certain of getting at least the lower LUE payoff by 
waiting until late in the game before conceding. Thus, a player who accepted the 
lower payoff early in the interaction passed up the chance of getting the higher pay-
off as a result of a concession by her opponent.21
B. The Time Path of Claims
Further insight into the dynamics of bargaining can be gained by looking at the 
evolution of players’ claims prior to the sealing of agreements. The relevant data are 
provided in the online Appendix. These data reveal a striking regularity across all 
games with two unequal LUE allocations; during the second phase of play, the value 
of the claims made by players who had not yet agreed converged to the higher LUE 
payoff. For example, at 60 seconds in G13 (= 2, 1, 2, 1| |2, 2, 1), 19 pairs had not 
yet agreed; 10 of the unfavored players and 13 of the favored players were claim-
ing discs worth exactly £6. At 60 seconds in G29 (= 5| |5, 5), 57 pairs had not yet 
agreed; 50 of the unfavored players and 49 of the favored players were claiming 
discs worth exactly £10.
It is clear from this regularity that, for most players who reached the final phase 
of play, that phase was essentially a game of Chicken. The first player to back down 
took the lower LUE payoff, allowing the other player to take the higher payoff. If 
neither had backed down when the deadline was reached, the payoff was zero for 
both. Notice the implication that, until the moment at which one player backed 
down, the two players were typically making claims of equal value, even if spatial 
cues favored one player relative to the other. Thus, if asymmetric spatial cues had 
any effect on agreements reached in the final phase, that effect would not be visible 
in players’ claims in the run-up to the moment of agreement.
C. Comparisons between Early and Late Agreements
In the light of the regularities described in the previous subsections, it is natural to 
ask whether there were systematic differences between early and late agreements. 
21 In a game with spatial cues, an unfavored player might use Schelling’s backward-induction reasoning and 
conclude that her favored opponent would hold out to the end of the game. But this argument cannot explain the 
frequency of early agreements in spatially neutral games.
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To address this question, we divide our data into two categories—early agreement 
interactions and deadline interactions. Early agreement interactions are those in 
which an agreement was sealed in the first 60 seconds; anything else is a deadline 
interaction. In the online Appendix, we present the content of Tables 2A and 2B 
separately for the two kinds of interaction.
This disaggregation shows that inequality in final payoffs between favored and 
unfavored players was mainly confined to early agreements. Recall that there are 14 
cases (identified in Sections IVB and IVC) in which spatial cues pick out efficient 
but unequal allocations. For early agreement interactions, NPA is positive in 12 of 
the 14 cases, and the asymmetry is significant in 8 of these ( p < 0.1 for 8 cases, 
p < 0.05 for 6, p < 0.01 for 4). For deadline interactions, NPA is positive in only 
9 of the 14 cases, and the asymmetry is significant in only 1 (albeit with p < 0.01.)
This disaggregation reveals a further interesting regularity. Recall that inter-
actions resulting in inefficient LIE allocations with nonzero payoffs were rare, 
and almost wholly confined to the three-disc games G19–G30. Comparatively, 
however, such outcomes were much more common in early agreement interac-
tions than in deadline interactions. Summing over all early agreement interactions 
in G19–G30, there were 64 LIE allocations and 350 LUE allocations (a ratio of 
1 to 5.5). The corresponding numbers for deadline interactions were 32 and 454 
(a ratio of 1 to 14.2).
D. The Advantage Conferred by Early Claims
One might conjecture that players who are quicker at making claims in the first 
few seconds gain an advantage over their opponents.22 We investigate this possibil-
ity by looking at the value of the discs that had been claimed by each player five 
seconds after the start of the game, excluding cases in which an agreement had 
already been sealed at that time. The value of the discs claimed by player L at five 
seconds minus the value of the discs claimed by R at five seconds provides a mea-
sure of the early claim advantage of L relative to R. By comparing this with the 
payoff difference in favor of L (that is, the final payoff to L minus the final payoff 
to R), we can ask whether players with a positive early claim advantage tended to 
achieve higher payoffs than their coplayers. However, in games with spatial cues, 
this comparison is subject to a potential confound. If players’ first claims are of the 
discs closest to their bases, positive correlation between early claim advantage and 
final payoff asymmetry might indicate the effects of a common causal factor—the 
spatial layout of the discs. This problem can be avoided by confining the analysis 
to spatially neutral games. Regressing payoff difference in spatially neutral games 
against early claim advantage, we find a highly significant relationship ( p < 0.001) 
with a coefficient of 0.19 (implying that an early claim advantage of £1 generates a 
payoff difference of £0.19).23
22 This idea was suggested to us by an anonymous referee.
23 We use random-effects GLS regressions, clustering at the level of the four-subject group. We pool the data 
from all spatially neutral games in Sets I and II. We exclude cases in which pairs failed to reach agreement. (In 
such cases, payoff difference is necessarily zero.) Further details of these regressions are provided in the online 
Appendix.
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However, if data from early agreement interactions are excluded from this regres-
sion, the relationship between payoff difference and early claim advantage is much 
weaker, with a much smaller coefficient (0.08), which is only marginally significant 
( p = 0.087). The implication is that early claim advantage had relatively little effect 
in the final phase of play. This perhaps reflects the fact that, as noted in Section VB, 
that phase typically began with both players maintaining claims with the same total 
value. In other words, any facts on the ground created by either player’s early claim 
advantage had typically been erased before the final phase of play.
E. Group Heterogeneity
In the light of the results we have reported so far, it would be interesting to know 
whether there was heterogeneity in players’ hawkishness—that is, the strength of 
their inclination to hold out for larger payoffs—and in their spatial awareness—
that is, their susceptibility to the effects of spatial cues. In principle, these are indi-
vidual-level characteristics. However, the dynamic and interactive features of our 
bargaining table games make it very difficult to isolate characteristics of strategies 
at this level.
At first sight, it might seem that one could use some definition of players’ “initial” 
claims, and then treat those claims as if the two players had made them indepen-
dently. But in our bargaining protocol, players could build up claims in a gradual 
fashion, so any notion of initial claims would be arbitrary. Many interactions ended 
in agreement within the first ten seconds, but in other cases players built up their 
claims gradually during the first phase of the game, presumably in awareness of 
their opponents’ current claims. A further complication is that many pairs of play-
ers seemed to use the making and canceling of claims as a flexible language for 
exchanging messages. Another possible approach would be to focus on players’ 
claims in the middle phase of the game, when the rate of agreement was lowest. But, 
as explained in Section VB, claims in this phase showed little heterogeneity.
We suggest that the cleanest approach to the investigation of heterogeneity is to 
use matching groups as the unit of observation. Because of sampling variation in 
the formation of groups, one might expect heterogeneity at the individual level to 
induce some degree of heterogeneity at the group level. For each matching group 
and for each of the 18 games, we consider the number of agreements sealed by 
60 seconds (an index of dovishness, i.e., the converse of hawkishness), and the num-
ber of interactions ending with the (0, 0) allocation (an index of hawkishness). For 
games with spatial cues, we also consider NPA (an index of spatial awareness). 
Using Kruskal-Wallis tests, we find strongly significant differences for the first two 
variables in both Set I and Set II, indicating substantial heterogeneity in hawkish-
ness, but we find no evidence of heterogeneity in spatial awareness.
F. Learning
So far, we have discussed our results as if each of the 18 games was played in 
isolation. One might ask whether there were any systematic changes in behavior 
over the sequence of games played by each subject which could be relevant for the 
interpretation of our results. In fact, there were no strong effects of this kind.
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Recall that, in each experimental session, games were presented in random order. 
Thus, for any given game, we can compare the behavior of pairs who faced it in 
the first half of the relevant session (that is, as one of the first nine games they 
played) with that of pairs who faced it in the second half. We make such compari-
sons in respect of average efficiency, NPA (for games in which spatial cues suggest 
an unequal allocation), and bargaining duration. We find few cases of significant dif-
ferences in efficiency between the two halves of either Set I or Set II sessions, and no 
overall pattern of increase or decrease. There is some evidence that NPA increased 
over the course of Set I sessions, suggesting that subjects were learning to make use 
of spatial cues, but there seems to be no trend (in either direction) in Set II sessions. 
Cumulative distributions of bargaining duration are sometimes significantly differ-
ent between the first and second halves of sessions, but there is no overall pattern 
of increasing or decreasing duration. However, there seems to be some tendency 
for bargaining duration to increase in games in which the LUE allocation is very 
unequal (particularly in G28–G30), suggesting that subjects were learning to be 
more hawkish in such games.
G. Summary
The key to many of the regularities that we have described in this section is the 
distinction between early agreement and deadline interactions in games in which 
there are two unequal LUE allocations. We conjecture that two different modes of 
bargaining may have been at work in these games.
In the first 60 seconds of play of these games, between 30 and 85 percent of 
pairs reached agreement, and these agreements were concentrated in the first 
30 seconds. In most such agreements, one player accepted the lower LUE pay-
off and allowed the other player to take the higher payoff; in a small minority of 
cases, both players took the lower LUE payoff and some surplus was lost. This 
seems to indicate a dovish mode of bargaining—that is, a disinclination to contest 
for the larger share of the surplus—on the part of those players who accepted 
the lower LUE payoff early in the game. In contrast, the final 30 seconds of play 
seem to be best characterized as a contest between two hawkish players, both 
of whom were holding out for the higher payoff, postponing concession as long 
as they dared. Since the proportion of early agreement interactions is inversely 
related to the inequality of the LUE allocation, we know that subjects cannot be 
partitioned into unconditional hawks and unconditional doves. But the heteroge-
neity of hawkishness at the group level suggests some underlying heterogeneity at 
the individual level. The fact that the main effects of payoff-irrelevant cues were 
on early agreement interactions suggests, contrary to Schelling’s “midnight bell” 
intuition, that those effects were mediated by the bargaining strategies of the more 
dovish players.
VI. An Alternative Implementation of Spatial Neutrality
In our main treatment, we have assessed the power of spatial cues using “spa-
tially neutral” games as controls. Recall that in these games, discs are located on a 
bargaining table on which each player has a “base”; neutrality is implemented by 
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making every disc equidistant from the two bases. An alternative way of implement-
ing spatial neutrality would be to remove the bases altogether.24 As a check on the 
robustness of our findings, we ran a control treatment in which bargaining tables 
were displayed without bases. This treatment is described in detail in the online 
Appendix. Here we present only a brief summary.
In the control treatment, each of 92 subjects played 30 games in pairs formed 
using the same matching protocol as in the main treatment. The games were iden-
tical to G1–G30 in all respects except the following. First, the two bases on each 
bargaining table were removed. Second, the table was not rotated. Thus, both play-
ers saw the table in the orientation shown in Figure 1, rather than with the player’s 
own base at the bottom. Third, since there were no bases, players’ claims at each 
moment were shown only by the colors of the discs. Except for the fact that there 
were 30 games rather than 18, the control treatment was organized in exactly the 
same way as the main treatment. Subjects were recruited in the same way from the 
same pool. No individual participated in both treatments.
We found almost no significant differences in players’ behavior between games 
with the same disc collection but different disc locations. The same is true for com-
parisons of average efficiency, of the percentage of LUE allocations, and of bargain-
ing duration. In other words, in the absence of bases, players took no account of the 
spatial layout of the discs. The implication is that the “no bases” displays lacked 
salient spatial cues that the players could use in bargaining.
To test whether the same was true of the spatially neutral games used in the 
main treatment, we compare behavior between those games and the corresponding 
games in the control treatment. On each of the three dimensions of comparison, we 
found almost no significant differences.25 Our interpretation is that spatially neutral 
displays with bases do indeed eliminate salient spatial cues which can be used in 
bargaining.
However, the fact that the two different methods of implementing spatial neu-
trality corroborate one another has useful implications for the design of bargaining 
experiments. The bargaining table design provides a simple, easily understood, and 
relatively unstructured representation of bargaining problems. It allows very quick 
exchanges of nonbinding and standardized messages which participants can easily 
grasp and which are easy for the experimenter to code and analyze. It seems that if 
one is not specifically investigating the effect of spatial cues, the design can be made 
even simpler by removing the bases and positioning the discs randomly or arbitrarily.
VII. Trade-Offs between Efficiency and Equality
Taken together, our results show a clear pattern in players’ responses to trade-offs 
between efficiency and equality. In all the bargaining games we investigated, there 
24 This control was suggested by an anonymous referee who conjectured that the generally low disagreement 
rates for the Set I games in the main treatment might be explained by spatial properties of the bargaining table. In 
the light of the later Set II data, we suggest that the low disagreement rates in G1–G4 and G7–G18 result from the 
feasibility of EE or only slightly unequal LUE allocations in those games.
25 Since there are ten spatially neutral games, ten comparisons can be made on each of the three dimensions. 
We found significant differences in only two of these comparisons. (G11 had lower average efficiency and a lower 
percentage of LUE agreements in the control treatment than in the main treatment.)
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was a strong tendency for players to settle on LUE allocations. This tendency was 
found even if equal but inefficient allocations were feasible, and even if spatial cues 
suggested non-LUE allocations. In this section, we comment on this tendency. The 
role of spatial cues will be discussed in Section VIII.
Our subjects’ reluctance to settle on equal but inefficient allocations when effi-
cient but unequal allocations were possible may seem surprising, given the large 
body of experimental evidence which suggests that people are typically inequality 
averse. Of course, our finding must be interpreted in relation to the constraints that 
the bargaining table design imposes on efficiency/equality trade-offs. Recall that if 
the LUE allocations are denoted by (x, y) and ( y, x), and the LIE allocation by (z, z), 
the design necessitates z ≤ min(x, y). Nevertheless, the preponderance of LUE 
allocations in cases such as x = 7, y = 4, z = 4 (games G25–G27), and x = 10, 
y = 5, and z = 5 (games G28–G30), suggests a lack of concern by subjects about 
inequality. If subjects were averse to disadvantageous inequality, as hypothesized 
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), player L in such a 
game would prefer (z, z) to ( y, x), and player R would prefer (z, z) to (x, y). Thus, 
(z, z) would be nondominated in utility, and its equality of money payoffs might be 
expected to make it salient as a potential bargaining outcome.
It may be relevant that much of the evidence for inequality aversion comes from 
ultimatum games, dictator games, trust games, and social dilemmas, which are 
quite different from our games. We conjecture that the framing and protocol of our 
experimental games may have prompted affective responses and modes of reason-
ing which are characteristic of real bargaining behavior and may have reduced the 
salience of considerations of fairness and equality.
Another important feature of our design is that, apart from the spatial locations of 
discs relative to bases, the positions of the two players are completely symmetrical. 
There is no predetermined order of moves, as in ultimatum games. Each disc has 
the same value to both players, and the rules of the game give each player the same 
opportunity to claim it. Thus, if the outcome of the game is unequal, its inequality 
may seem less objectionable because it has been reached by a procedure which 
respects equality of opportunity. This form of equality is particularly salient when, 
as was often the case in our experiment, the final stage of an interaction is a Chicken 
game in which the players maintain conflicting LUE claims as long as they individu-
ally dare. The hypothesis that people are more tolerant of ex post inequality if it is 
the result of a fair procedure has been proposed before, but fairness has usually been 
understood in terms of players’ intentions (e.g., Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2003; 
Bolton, Brandts, and Ockenfels 2005). We suggest that procedural fairness in our 
bargaining games is a property not of individuals’ attitudes to one another’s payoffs 
or intentions, but of the rules of the game they are playing.26
26 This conjecture about the effect of procedural fairness is consistent with a piece of evidence from the explicit 
bargaining experiment reported by Herreiner and Puppe (2010). In the game with the most severe efficiency/equal-
ity trade-off (“R3”), the least-unequal Pareto-efficient allocations were (66, 40) and (46, 75); the equal allocation 
with highest payoffs was (45, 45). Out of 48 pairs of coplayers, 22 settled on (45, 45) and 19 on (46, 75), suggesting 
a greater willingness to sacrifice efficiency for equality than in our experiment. In Herreiner and Puppe’s experi-
ment, unlike ours, players’ payoff opportunities were not symmetrical.
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VIII. Conclusion
The main objective of our experiment was to answer a question that has remained 
open for over 50 years: Are the outcomes of explicit bargaining games influenced 
by payoff-irrelevant cues, as Schelling (1960) hypothesized? Our bargaining table 
design allowed us to set up explicit bargaining games into which payoff-irrelevant 
spatial cues could be introduced in an apparently natural way. The cues we used 
were known to influence behavior in pure coordination and tacit bargaining games. 
Our experiment tested the power of those cues relative to that of payoff-based prin-
ciples of efficiency and equality, when players were able to communicate with one 
another over time and to propose and accept binding agreements.
We found no evidence that spatial cues were effective in opposition to princi-
ples of efficiency and equality. There was a very consistent tendency for players to 
agree to allocations which were efficient and minimally unequal, even if spatial cues 
picked out other allocations—whether those other allocations were equal but inef-
ficient, or efficient but less than minimally unequal. Nevertheless, spatial cues had 
some influence on players’ payoffs. In games in which efficiency could be achieved 
only at the cost of an asymmetry in payoffs, players faced the problem of coordinat-
ing on which of them would take the larger share of the available surplus. In such 
games, payoff-irrelevant cues which favored one player relative to the other tended 
to skew the outcome of the game to the advantage of the former. In this respect, our 
results give qualified support to Schelling’s hypothesis.
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